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gation declares: "The right to life is the primordial right of the human person. The
person has other goods, some of them even more precious to him than life, but
the right to life is the foundation and condition of all others." In other words,
human beings possess God-given, inalienable rights to liberty, property and the
pursuit of happiness, but these rights cannot be exercised unless we are alive .
Consequently, the right to life is the most basic human right given to man by God .
Also, as the Congregation goes on to say, "It is not within the competence of
society or public authority, whatever its form, to give that right [that is, the right
to life 1 to some and take it away from others. Any such grounds of race or sex,
skin color or religion , is always unjust. The right to life does not derive from the
favor of other human beings but exists prior to any such favor and must therefore
be acknowledged as such. The denial of it is an injustice in the strict sense of the
word." In short, human life is sacred; it emanates from the hand of God; the right
to life is not some favor granted to human beings by society or the government
but, rather , is a God-given right. As such , the right to life demands our acknowledgment, respect and protection.
From reading the Church's documents on love, sexuality and human life, it
becomes readily apparent why so many of our modern advocates and practitioners
of "free sex" or sexual irresponsibility consider the Catholic Church its primary
foe. For them, sex is simply a plaything or a tool to enhance one's popularity or
to alleviate one's doubts about one's masculinity or femininity.
On the other hand, as the Church's documents clearly demonstrate, the Catholic Church has a noble, beautiful view of sex, marriage, procreation, family and
human life. For the Catholic Church, sex should be the communion of life and
love within the sacrament of marriage.
- Haven Bradford Gow
Arlington Heights, TIl.

Abortion: New Directions for Policy Studies
Edward Manier, William Liu and David Soloman, Editors
University of No tre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556, 1977. x + 186 pp.,
$9.95.
Abortion: New Directions for Policy Studies is a collection of papers on abortion prese nted at the University of Notre Dame in 1975 , together with reflections
on these papers by the editors and an analysis of several 1976 abortion decisions
by the Supreme Court. The papers coll ect e d here are from several disciplinescomparative constitutional law, philosophy and sociology - and they deal with
various aspects of the abortion issue. The editors seek to bring t h ese papers
together into a view which avoids as much as possible the partisan perspectives of
the contending parti es in the abortion controversy and which can thus suggest
new lines of inquiry and the possibility for developing some sort of normative
consensus on abortion. I think their effort fails.
Nevertheless, the individual papers are all in one way or another valuable .
Several of them are important contributions to the discussion of abortion - for
example, Donald Kommers' insightful comparison of the abortion decisions of the
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U.S. Supreme Court and of the West German Federal Constitutional Court. Thus,
this volume is a useful addition to the non-medical literature on abortion.
Judith Blake's contribution is a survey of the trend in public opinion on
various aspects of abortion from the early 1960 's to 1975. Blake focuses upon the
relation between public opinion and the liberal policy enjoined by the Supreme
Court in 1973. She finds considerable discrepancy between the views of the Court
and those of the public at large. Although the trend over the last 10 years is
towards approval of a more permissive policy on abortion , a majority of peoplemen as well as women and non-Catholics as well as Catholics - remain opposed to
a public policy that puts no restrictions on abortion.
Given the state of public opinion , Blake criticizes those proponents of liberalized abortion who have refused to take seriously the threat to their program
which is posed by right to life groups. These groups have effectively thwarted the
implementation of the " spirit" of the 1973 decisions by non-compliance and by
developing strategies of collateral deterrence . What is more , these groups may be
having some impact on public opinion: between 1973 and 1975 the number of
people believing that human life begins at conception has increased.
This proposition that human life begins at conception is the focus of considerable attention in the philosophical contributions. Roger Wertheimer argues for
what he calls "the Standard Belief" - that is , that a human being has human
(moral) status in virtue of being a human being. Wertheimer's defense of this
proposition is elegant and persuasive ; it includes a compelling criticism of philosophers who make being a person - which is defined by properties other than
simply being human - as the basis for having moral status. Thus, Wertheimer
thinks that the disagreements about abortion are fundamentally disagreement;
about whether the zygote or fetus is a human being. (See pp. 118, 120.) He claims
that this question cannot be answered. His reason seems to be that "no neat set of
conditions necessary and sufficient for being human is generally agreed on ," (p.
124) as the abortion argument itself reveals. In particular, the anti-abortion argument does not show that the zygote is the same human being as the later adult ; it
shows only that the zygote is the same human body which the later adult has. Just
as a corpse is not the same human being as the living person , it is not clear that th e
human body of the zygote is the human being who will have that body.
Edmund Pincoffs also argues that there is no condition or set of conditions
necessary or sufficient for the determination of the humanity of such classes as
the class of embryos. One such condition is being of human ancestry. His argument against the sufficiency of this condition for determining humanity begins
with a recognition that a human egg fertilized by human sperm is a human
fertilized egg. He gives three reasons why the human egg fertilized is not necessarily a human being: monstrous births are of human ancestry but are doubtfully
human; the genetic characteristics of human offspring can be made to vary
widely by manipulating nucleic acids ; and programmed beings are doubtfully
human though of human ancestry. Pincoffs does not, however, despair of somehow rationally deciding whether or not some doubtfully human classes of entities
are human. This issue can be resolved by a d ecision which need not be completely
arbitrary; this decision should be based on the very conditions which he has
argued are not necessary and sufficient to settle membership in the class of human
beings. These conditions provide a rational basis for a decision but some arbitrariness remains: "Sometimes the only way to achieve consensus is to entrust the
decision to an Official Decider who , within the constraints of the going criteria,
just decides" (p. 48).
II

The editors present further arguments that the question of whether human life
begins at conception cannot be settled. One might suppose, then , that we are to
conclude that since this question and other central questions in the abortion
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co n troversy cannot be settled , t he parti es to the controversy sho uld back off fro m
t h e pa rt isa n excesses which ch arac t eri ze th e di spu te in order to avo id the normative c haos to which t hese excesses are lea ding.
Such a co nclu sion is unlik e ly to be acce ptabl e to t h e contesting parties. For
exa mpl e, the conce rn to d eve lop consensus and to avoid normativ e ch aos is
lik e ly to see m less impOl·tan t to t he anti-abortionist than t h e protection of
unb orn li fe. Mmeover, t h e a nt i-a bmtionist is not irratio nal if h e or she regards the
argum ents that t h e humani ty of t he emb ,·yo is no t settled to b e less than d e finitive. Many qu est ion s read il y come to mind : why sh ou ld lack of conse nsus on the
question o f the hum anity of t he fet us be dec isive? Is one's body ide ntical with his
cmpse in t h e same way as it is ide ntical with t h e e mbryo from which one came?
How can a li vi n g hum a n bei ng be distinguished from hi s or h er living body ? If
monsters are do u btfull y hum a n , wh y sho uld any e mbryo be a lso doubt fully
human ? If t he issue ca n 't be sett led on empirical or conceptual grounds , why must
the dec is ion b e in so me m eas ure arbitrary? Does o ur pluralistic legal and moral
syst em conta in no norms wh ic h may be use d to justify favoring the m emb ership
of d is pu ted classes in hum ani ty?
So it is by no mea ns settled t h at th e question of t he humani ty o f t he emb ryo is
unsettled. The argu m e n ts about whethe r or not this qu est ion and oth e rs lik e it are
sett led a re in ev ita bl y part of t h e p art isa n controversy. This inev itab ility suggests
t ha t a Catholi c unive rs ity mi gh t b ette r execute its civ ic resp onsibi li ty on issues
like ab ortio n by p ro motin g t he debate o r for m all y getting in to it t h an by
attempting to di scuss or to re-o rient t h e de bate. If t his were done, perhaps the
anti-abortion posit io n which t h e editors rega rd as unsophisticated would get the
academ ic ela bora tio n whi ch m any Ame ri ca ns feel it dese rves.
- Joseph M. Boy le , Jr. , Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
College of St. Thomas

Encyclopedia

0/ Bioethics

Warren T. Reich, Editor
The Fre e Press, New York, N. Y., 1978. 4 vo lumes, $200.0 0.
When t he first tentative questions and artic les in bio eth ics b ega n to e me rge
so m e two deca des ago, few rea li zed th e trem e ndou s impact t h ese q u est ions would
ha ve. Now we have the Encyclopedia of Bioethics whic h surely was not envis io n ed
wh en s uch questions were first ra ised , bu t which serves as an authentic co nfirmatio n bo t h o f the im portance of bi oethi cs as a fie ld of stu dy in itse lf a nd its value
in helping to address man y contempora,-y d il emmas in t he life sc ie nces and h ea lth
care . The basic p lll·pose of t he e ncy clop edi a is not "to freeze kno wl edge, but to
summ arize a nd ana lyze t he hi storical and current state of knowledge in bioet h ics. " Anoth er purpose is to st imulate fu t ure ,-esearch , sure ly a unique goal for
an e ncyc lo ped ia. In th e fo ll ow ing , a genera l overv iew of the e ncy clopedia is given
first , and t he n spec ific articl es o n th e fo ll ow ing topic s are critic ize d: abortion,
death , in forme d co nse nt and popul ation eth ics.
One test of the promise of a proj ect such as t his is the quality of t h e ed itorial
staff, the edi tmial adviso ry bo ard, and the authors. Many of the editors a nd
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